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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.

:

LETHRON D. TATE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981793-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue:

Whether the use of hearsay and multiple hearsay

testimony by a police officer at an order to show cause hearing
as the only evidence to establish that Appellant failed to comply
with the terms of probation violates Appellant's right to
confrontation and due process?
Standard of Review:

This issue involves a question of law

which is reviewed for correctness.

See Layton City v. Peronek,

803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990)(without explicitly stating
standard of review, applying correctness standard in concluding
that the use of hearsay at a probation violation hearing violated
due process); see generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994) (appellate courts review a trial judge's determination
of the law for correctness).
Preservation of the Argument:
R. 88:1-2.

This argument is preserved at

A copy of the entire transcript of the Order to Show

Cause hearing (R. 88) is in Addendum A.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following relevant statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions is contained in Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998);
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated January 30, 1997, the state charged
Appellant/Defendant Lethron Demetrius Tate ("Appellant,"
"Lethron" or "Tate") with one count of robbery, a second degree
felony.

(R. 5-6)

On March 3, 1997, Appellant pled guilty to

attempted robbery, a third degree felony.

(R. 17)

On April 21, 1997, the trial judge entered judgment.
(R. 27)

He sentenced Tate to serve zero to five years at the

Utah State Prison, but stayed the sentence and placed Appellant
on probation for three years.

(R. 27-8)

A copy of the Judgment

is in Addendum C.
On July 15, 1998, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") filed
a Progress/Violation Report and Affidavit in Support of Order to
Show Cause, alleging that Tate had violated his probation in that
he had committed the crime of Aggravated Assault.

(R. 33-5)

judge issued an Order to Show Cause on July 15, 1998.

The

(R. 38-9)

Tate denied the allegation, and the judge scheduled an
evidentiary hearing for August 11, 1998.

(R. 49-50)

The state was unable to proceed at the evidentiary hearing
on the Order to Show Cause, and the trial judge dismissed the
2

Order to Show Cause.

(R. 49)

On August 27, 1998, AP&P filed a

second Progress/Violation Report and an Amended Affidavit in
Support of Order to Show Cause.

(R. 51-4)

The second violation

report and Amended Affidavit alleged that Tate violated his
probation by committing the offense of aggravated assault and an
additional offense of forgery.

(R. 51-4)

Copies of the second

Progress/Violation Report and the Amended Affidavit are in
Addendum D.
Tate denied both allegations.

(R. 59)

hearing was held on October 27, 1998.

An evidentiary

(R. 64)

The trial judge

determined that Tate had violated his probation in regard to both
allegations, and imposed the original sentence of zero to five
years at the Utah State Prison.

(R. 64-5)

The trial judge

entered his order revoking probation on October 28, 1998.
(R. 64-5)

Tate filed a timely Notice of Appeal on November 4,

1998, appealing from this order.

(R. 72)

A copy of the order

being appealed is in Addendum E.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At the Order to Show Cause hearing, the state did not
present any of the witnesses to the two crimes it alleged that
Appellant had committed.

Instead, the state presented the

testimony of the investigating officers, who recounted hearsay
and multiple hearsay statements which potential witnesses had
made to the officers.

3

1.

Allegation That Appellant Committed Forgeries

Officer Richard Boddy was the only witness offered in
support of allegation number 2, the claim that Tate had committed
the crime of forgery.

Officer Boddy testified that he

investigated a complaint of forgery at a Denny's Restaurant
located in West Valley City.

(R. 88:3)

The officer testified

that he collected five checks which were drawn on the account of
Brenda Woelfel.

(R. 4, 6 ) 1

Officer Boddy testified that Woelfel told him that new
checks had been sent to her but taken out of her mailbox before
she received them, and "passed all over town, and quite a few of
them at Denny's."

(R. 88:5)

The officer had shown the five

checks he had which were made out to Denny's to Woelfel, and "had
statements from her saying that she was not the author of those
checks."

(R. 88:5)

Boddy also testified that Woelfel told him

that she had not authorized anyone else to use the checks.
(R. 88:5)

The five checks were made out for $70.33, $59.87,

$51.76, $80.25, and $80.50.

(R. 88:8)

Additionally, Boddy testified that he talked to Larry
Thompson, the manager at Denny's.

1

(R. 88:7)

Boddy testified

Officer Boddy testified that his forgery investigation
actually involved 27 checks which had been passed at Denny's.
(R. 88:4) The checks came from two different accounts held by two
different individuals at two different banks. (R. 88:4) Most of
the checks were drawn on the account of Antonio Ascencio.
(R. 88:4, 6)
Boddy never spoke with Ascencio, however, and
clarified during the course of his testimony that the checks drawn
on Mr. Ascencio's account were not relevant to the Order to Show
Cause hearing because officers were unable to establish who had
passed those checks. (R. 88:5, 6)
4

that Thompson told him that Thompson "was told by the banks, and
because of the affidavits that were filed by the victim on the
checks, in this case Brenda Woelfel, that these checks were again
not authored by herself and that she at no time ever issued,
wrote or authored any of the checks at the Denny's."

(R. 88:7)

Boddy testified further that Thompson told him the checks were
returned to Denny's unpaid.

(R. 88:7)

Boddy also recounted that he had conversations with Thompson
which led to a suspect.

(R. 88:8)

Thompson mentioned the names

of three employees, Julie Marks, Elizabeth Price and Tate, as
well as the name of Amanda Calouza, who was not an employee.
(R. 88:8)

This led the officer to talk with Marks and Price.

(R. 88:9, 10)
Boddy testified that Marks told him Price had possessed two
of the checks and wanted Marks to fill them out.

(R. 88:12, 16)

When Marks refused, Price said, "I'll get Lethron to do it."
(R. 88:16)

Boddy said Marks told him that "Lethron was working

as a server that evening, and they wrote out of the checks, and
then went up to the register and gave Lethron the checks and he
then gave her the money for them."

(R. 88:12-13)

It is unclear

who, in addition to Price, comprised the "they" who wrote out the
checks.

Boddy also said that Marks told him that she did not see

Appellant pass any checks.

(R. 88:9)

Although Marks did not see Appellant pass any checks
(R. 88:9), according to Officer Boddy, Marks told him she had
further "knowledge that Lethron Tate had passed a couple of
5

checks there through Elizabeth Price"; Boddy also said Marks told
him she "was privy to the information and the conversations
between Lethron Tate and Elizabeth Price."

(R. 88:9)

The

officer summarized the information he received from Marks:
that the checks were indeed stolen, they were being
passed and the blame was being passed back and forth as
to who was going to take the fall for this. Statements
by Lethron Tate to Elizabeth Price that, you know, he
wasn't going down alone, that everyone else was going
to go with us, as well, and this included Amanda
Calouza, his girlfriend.
(R. 88:9-10)
The officer testified as to this general information, but
did not provide any specifics as to the content of the
conversations Marks supposedly overheard between Tate and Price.
(R. 88:17)

This is because Marks did not include the contents of

the conversations in her statement.

(R. 88:17-18)

Marks did

indicate, however, that " [Price] had called her and said that she
had just talked to Lethron and she had told him that she was
going to blame everything on him, and he had said, 'what?,' and
she said what else was she to do, she has four kids."

(R.88:18)

Officer Boddy also testified regarding statements Price had
made to him.

(R. 88:10-11)

Price initially told him that she

had worked at Denny's for five years and did not know who was
writing the checks.

(R. 88:10, 15)

Although she initially

denied involvement, Price "changed and recanted her story" after
Marks told the officer about Price's involvement and after Price
was confronted by the officer regarding her participation.

6

(R. 88:10, 17) 2 After she knew she was in trouble, Price
pointed her finger at Tate, and told Boddy Tate was involved.
(R. 88:18-19)
Boddy also testified
in a post-Miranda statement, [Price] admitted to
accepting two or three of the checks. And I say two or
three because she wasn't sure how many she had gotten,
and that she had gotten those directly from Lethron at
Denny's, and that she had received money in return for
those checks.
(R. 88:10)

According to Boddy, Price also told him that "she

knew that Lethron Tate was keeping [the checks] either in the
house or in his vehicle, and he was the one who actually came to
her when she cashed out for meals at Denny's."

(R. 88:11)

Boddy also indicated that Price told him that Appellant had
presented three of the checks, and Appellant's girlfriend, Amanda
Calouza, had passed five of the checks.

(R. 88:ll) 3

After

referring to his report4, Boddy stated that Price told him that
"she took a total of six checks," all of which "were handed to

2

The officer testified that when he confronted Price with
the checks, "we" presented the checks to Price. (R. 88:10) He did
not indicate who besides himself was present and helped present the
checks to Price when this occurred.
(R. 88:10)
3

The officer's reference to eight checks is not consistent
with his prior testimony that only five checks were relevant to the
Order to Show Cause hearing. (See R. 88:4, 6, 11) It is not clear
from the record that the checks attributed to Appellant through the
officer's hearsay testimony were checks drawn on Woelfel's account.
Indeed, at least three of the checks apparently were not drawn on
Woelfel's account since only five of her checks were passed at
Denny's.
(R. 88:6)
4

The officer could not remember all of what the witnesses
had told him and referred to his report during the course of his
testimony in answering questions. (R. 88:11, 12)
7

her by Tate.

And on one occasion, she took one check from

Calouza, which included the meal and cash back."

(R. 88:11)

Boddy also said Price told him she had not seen Tate fill out the
checks, and that both she and Tate got money from the checks.
(R. 88:12)
Price was charged with several forgeries.

She entered into

a plea bargain, with at least one of the charges being dismissed
and the state agreeing to make sentencing recommendations for
probation.

(R. 88:20)

2. Allegation That Appellant Committed Aggravated
Assault
In allegation number 1, the state claimed that Appellant had
violated his probation by committing the crime of aggravated
assault.5

In support of this allegation, the state relied

solely on the hearsay testimony of two police officers.

Officer

Gilbert Salazar responded to a call on April 29, 1998, at about
10:00 p.m.

(R. 88:28)

He arrived at a fast food parking lot

located at 13 00 East 2100 South in Salt Lake City where he saw a
man who appeared to have been beaten up.

(R. 88:29)

Salazar

testified that the injured man, Steven Hanson, told him, "a black
guy beat him up."

(R. 88:29)

The witness who had called the police had not seen the

5

AP&P had previously filed a Progress/Violation Report
containing this allegation.
(R. 33-34) The state was unable to
proceed at the Order to Show Cause hearing, and the judge dismissed
the Order to Show Cause.
(R. 49) The state was also unable to
proceed at the preliminary hearing on the aggravated assault charge
because witnesses were not available; the magistrate continued the
preliminary hearing.
(R. 49)
8

fight.

(R. 88:30)

Salazar testified that the unnamed witness

told him that a car had rapidly left the parking lot, and that a
restaurant hat and shirt fell off the car.
had the name tag "Josh" on it.

(R. 88:30)

The shirt

(R. 88:30)

By telephone, Officer Salazar contacted a "Josh" who worked
at the restaurant.

(R. 88:31)

The officer could not remember

Josh's last name, and there were apparently two Joshes at the
restaurant.

(R. 88:31, 34, 35, 39)

Salazar testified that

"Josh" told him over the phone "that a friend of his named Tate
was the one that assaulted the victim."

(R. 88:31) 6

Working from "independent recollection" rather than a police
report, the officer testified that "Josh" "said the victim came
out and there were some words exchanged and the victim was
assaulted by the suspect.

And Josh told [the officer] over the

phone that he kept on telling the suspect to stop beating him."
(R. 88:31)
Officer Kelly Kent was assigned to do follow-up
investigation.

(R. 88:33-4)

employee of the restaurant.

She spoke to Josh Marquette, an
(R. 88:34)

Josh Marquette told the

officer
he and some friends were standing outside of the
restaurant in the parking lot, and that our victim had
been in the restaurant and came out. There was some
6

On cross-examination, Officer Salazar acknowledged that
while he could not remember exactly, "Josh" might have said the
person's name was Lethron rather than Tate, but at any rate, that
Josh could supply only a single name. (R. 88:32)
Officer Kelly
testified that when Josh Wagstaff talked to him, he referred to the
person as "Lee," and told the officer Lee lived with Amanda
Calouza.
(R. 88:35)
9

words exchanged over a Jazz game that had just
happened. They were making comments back and forth.
And that a young man named Lee or Lethron, is what he
knew, that was a friend of an ex-co-worker, who was
also present, and that he had gone over and that he had
assaulted our victim.
(R. 88:37)

Josh Marquette did not give the officer details about

what had occurred; "[h]e just said that there was an assault,
that he had seen him a couple of times, that he just whacked him
real hard and the kid went down."

(R. 88:34)

Officer Kent testified that Josh Wagstaff, who was also an
employee, told her that "there were some words exchanged and that
Lee, as he knew him, had assaulted Mr. Hanson, our victim."
(R. 88:35)

According to Officer Kelly, Josh Wagstaff told her

that "the word exchange had to do with the Jazz game and that the
Jazz sucked.

And he said that Lethron and Josh Marquette were

both over with the victim when the assault happened, that
Marquette had actually walked over with Lethron Tate over to the
victim, Mr. Hanson."

(R. 88:39)

Officer Kent also spoke with Hanson.

(R. 88:35)

Kent

testified that Hanson told her he had been unconscious for awhile
and could not remember much except that "there was some exchanges
of words and that out of nowhere this black male that was in the
parking lot hit him, and that's what he remembered of the
assault."
(R. 88:39)

(R. 88:36)

He was somewhat vague as to what occurred.

According to the officer, Hanson picked Appellant out

of a photo spread, but said that the hair was different.
(R. 88:35-6)

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's rights to confrontation and due process were
violated when the trial judge revoked his probation, relying
solely on hearsay evidence which was admitted without a finding
of good cause.

Minimum requirements of due process apply to a

probation revocation hearing.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

489 (1972); Gacrnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).

These

minimum requirements include "the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)."
Gacrnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S at 489).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (d) (iii) (Supp. 1998) codifies this
requirement.
The trial judge must explicitly make a finding that good
cause exists prior to admission of the hearsay in order to
constitutionally admit hearsay at a revocation hearing.

In this

case where the trial judge did not make such a finding,
Appellant's right to due process was violated.
Alternatively, assuming arguendo this Court could review the
record to determine whether good cause existed, the record in
this case fails to suggest good cause for not allowing
confrontation.

The state did not offer any legal or factual

reason for presenting only the testimony of the officers who
investigated the crimes alleged in the Order to Show Cause,
rather than the testimony of the purported wd tnesses to the use
alleged crimes.
11

Moreover, even if good cause existed to allow the admission
of the hearsay, the hearsay was so unreliable that its admission
violated due process.

In regard to the allegation that Tate

violated probation by committing forgery, the only evidence
indicating Tate was involved in a forgery was hearsay and
multiple hearsay statements made by a codefendant.
Admission and reliance on the codefendant's hearsay and
double hearsay statements implicating Tate violated due process.
The codefendant's confession implicating Tate was inadmissible
and unreliable.

Double hearsay statements as to what the

codefendant said to another person who then relayed the
statements to the officer who then testified were inherently
unreliable and admitted in violation of due process.

The

codefendant's other statements were unreliable given her selfinterest and questionable credibility.

Appellant required the

opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant as to her statements
and the finder of fact needed to view her to assess her
credibility.
The remaining evidence as to a forgery failed to implicate
Tate, also contained multiple hearsay, and required a live
witness in order to clarify details.

Additionally, the officer

simply testified to the contents of his police report, outlining
his investigation for the judge.

Police reports offered by the

state are unreliable; establishing a probation violation based
solely on hearsay and multiple hearsay gathered in a police
report violated due process.
12

The hearsay evidence admitted to support the assault
allegation was likewise constitutionally unreliable.

The

evidence consisted solely of the testimony of two officers
regarding statements made to them by purported witnesses.

The

information relayed by the officers raised questions as to
memory, accuracy of perception, motivation, and soundness of
conclusions.
The state presented its entire case through a superficial
summary containing few, if any, details.

Appellant needed to be

able to cross-examine the declarants as to their ability to see
the incident and details of what they might have seen.
Additionally, one of the hearsay declarants was a possible
codefendant, undermining the reliability of the statements.
Furthermore, given the problems with eyewitness identification
testimony, the identification testimony was not reliable absent
the ability to cross-examine regarding the Loner7/Ramirez8
factors.
Moreover, the record suggests that the state was having
difficulty establishing that this alleged crime occurred through
eyewitnesses who were under oath.

The trial judge had dismissed

a prior order to show cause based on this alleged incident since
the state was unable to proceed at the hearing, and the state was
also unable to proceed at the preliminary hearing.

The

suggestion in the record that the state was having difficulty
7

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 (Utah 1986)

8

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991)
13

establishing its case through live witnesses further undermines
the reliability of the officers' hearsay testimony as to what
those witnesses said to the officers.
ARGUMENT
POINT. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE
PROCESS WERE VIOLATED WHERE THE TRIAL JUDGE RELIED
SOLELY ON HEARSAY TESTIMONY AS THE BASIS FOR REVOKING
PROBATION.
Although probation revocation hearings are "relatively
informal" and " [m]ost of the rules of evidence do not apply" (see
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 279 (Utah App. 1990); Rule 1101,
Utah Rules of Evidence), the probationer nevertheless has the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the
trial judge makes a specific finding that good cause exists for
not allowing confrontation.

See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489;

Gacrnon, 411 U.S. at 786; Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298-1300; Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998) .9

In Morrissey, 408 U.S. at

48 9, the United States Supreme Court held that "the minimum
requirements of due process" apply to a parole revocation
proceeding.

Since "[t]he revocation of probation implicates a

probationer's fundamental liberty interest" (United States v.
Holland, 850 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1988)), the procedural due
process right applicable to parole revocation also applies to
probation revocation.

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786.

9

Those minimum

Appellant's argument is based on the federal due process
protection found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
Although the state constitution also guarantees a right to
confrontation and due process, Appellant does not make a distinct
state constitutional claim.
14

requirements of due process applicable to probation revocation
hearings include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of
(probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the
(probationer or) parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons
for revoking (probation or) parole.
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at
489) (emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(d)(iii) (Supp. 1998) codifies
the due process requirement of Morrissey and Gagnon that
probationers have the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses "unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation."10

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at

786 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(12)(d) states:
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit
or deny the allegations of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of
the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present
evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse
information on which the allegations are based shall be
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the
10

The parole revocation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11
(Supp. 1998) likewise includes the requirement that parolees have
the opportunity "to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
absent
a
showing
of
good
cause
for
not
allowing
the
confrontation... ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(5)(b)(iv) (Supp.
1998) .
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defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise
orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12) (d) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added);
see Addendum B containing entire text of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1
(Supp. 1998) .
In the present case, the trial judge did not make a specific
finding that good cause existed for not allowing confrontation.
Nor did the state argue that there was good cause for not
presenting the witnesses who provided the adverse information.
An explicit finding of good cause by the trial judge is an
"essential condition precedent" to the admission of hearsay
evidence in a revocation hearing; absent such a specific finding
by the trial court, a defendant's right to due process is
violated by the admission of hearsay evidence at a revocation
hearing.

See State v. DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I. 1978)

(where trial judge did not meet "essential condition precedent"
of finding good cause for denying confrontation prior to
admission of hearsay evidence, admission of hearsay evidence "was
constitutionally impermissible"); Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 388
A. 2d 1090, 1092 (Pa. 1977) ("by failing to make any such findings
of good cause for abridging appellant's dual rights of
confrontation and cross-examination, the hearing judge erred in
admitting the hearsay testimony in question"); Commonwealth v.
Davis, 336 A.2d 616, 624 (Pa. 1975)(same); Lawrence v. Smith, 451
F. Supp. 179, 187 (W.D. New York 1978) (quoting Baker v.
Wainwriaht, 527 F.2d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 1976)) ("xthere must be
16

an explicit, specific finding of such good cause, and the reasons
should be stated in the record of the revocation hearing'");
State v. Alderman, 590 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Ohio 1990) ("a trial court
may not base a revocation of probation on hearsay without making
a specific ruling of good cause for the admission of the
hearsay11); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (right to confrontation is
part of minimum requirements of due process applicable to
revocation proceedings "unless the hearing officer specifically
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation") (emphasis
added).
In Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1294, where the city relied solely
on hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing, this Court
stated:
defendant's right of meaningful confrontation was
denied, without any showing of good cause,3 when Layton
City chose to make its case through Lieutenant
Cunningham, who had only limited knowledge as outlined
above, rather than through the jailer who was actually
involved. The ensuing evidence against defendant was
violative of the confrontation prong of the Due Process
standard articulated in [United States v.] Holland [,
850 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1988)].
3

We note that the issue of good cause was not
reached by the trial court since it found
Lieutenant Cunningham to be a "qualified witness"
under Rule 803(6). However, nothing in the record
suggests good cause for denying the defendant this
fundamental right. Cf. United States
v. Bell,
785
F.2d 640, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1986)(good cause might
be found if the witness would be placed in danger
by testifying or where producing the witness would
cause great hardship and expense and the
documentary evidence is demonstrably reliableabsent such factors good cause cannot be found.)
Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299.

While the Peronek footnote is unclear

as to whether an appellate court might be able to review the
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record and make an after the fact finding as to whether good
cause exists, such a post-hearing review fails to comply with the
requirements of Morrissey and its progeny that the trial judge
make an explicit finding of good cause as a condition precedent
to admitting hearsay evidence at an order to show cause hearing.
See e.g. DeRoche, 389 A.2d at 1234; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489;
Rossetti, 388 A.2d at 1092.

In this case where the state did not

argue that good cause existed for allowing hearsay evidence and
the trial judge did not make a specific finding prior to
admission of the hearsay that good cause existed, Tate's rights
to confrontation and due process were violated by the admission
of the hearsay.
Additionally, even if this Court were to review the record
to determine at this juncture whether good cause existed for
admission of the hearsay, "nothing in the record suggests good
cause for denying the defendant this fundamental right."
Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299 fn. 3.

The state did not make any

legal argument as to why it should be permitted to put on hearsay
evidence; nor did it present any factual information or argument
indicating that good cause might exist for denying Tate his right
to confrontation.

(R. 88:1-3)

The state offered no explanation

for not presenting live testimony; indeed, it was simply easier
for the state to present its case through the officers than to
subpoena and examine the witnesses to the alleged crimes.

Under

such circumstances, reliance solely on hearsay evidence absent a
finding or the existence of good cause violated Tate's right to
18

confrontation and due process as well as the requirements of
Section 77-18-1(12) (d) (iii) .
Even if good cause had existed for denying confrontation,
Tate's right to confrontation and due process was nevertheless
violated in this case because the hearsay was unreliable and
cross-examination of the officer was "nothing more than an
exercise in futility."

Hill v. State, 350 So. 2d 716, 718 (Ala.

App. 1977)(cross-examination of probation officer who had no
firsthand knowledge rather than "the persons who originated the
factual information which formed the basis for the revocation"
"amounted to nothing more than an exercise in futility" in
violation of due process); Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298-1300.
In Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298-1300, the only evidence
introduced at the order to show cause hearing which supported the
probation violation allegation was an incident report indicating
that Peronek had consumed alcohol.

This Court concluded that

revoking Peronek's probation based solely on that hearsay
violated Peronek's rights to due process and confrontation.

Id.

In reaching that decision, this Court emphasized the
importance of the right to confrontation, and the need for
reliability when a party seeks to admit hearsay testimony in lieu
of "live" testimony.

Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299.

The hearsay rule long predates the Federal
Constitution, and it is generally accepted that the
Confrontation Clause was intended by the drafters of
the Bill of Rights to exclude certain hearsay testimony
even if otherwise admissible. Whether the use of
documentary hearsay as a substitute for "live"
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testimony is violative of the Confrontation Clause
turns on the indicia of reliability of the document or
statement sought to be admitted.
[citations omitted.]
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).

This Court determined that

the hearsay evidence was not constitutionally reliable since it
did not demonstrate that the breathalyzer used to measure
Peronek's blood alcohol level was "functioning properly, or that
the person administering the test had the appropriate skills to
operate the device and interpret the results, or that the record
card appended to the incident report was an accurate reflection
of the device's readings."

Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299.

Some courts have found a due process violation only where
the revocation is based solely on hearsay evidence.

See Stanley

v. State, 587 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Ala. App. 1991)("while strict
adherence to evidentiary formalities are not required in
revocation proceedings, hearsay evidence may not form the sole
basis of revocation"); Alderman, 590 N.E.2d at 838 (absent a
specific ruling by trial judge that good cause existed for
admission of hearsay, reliance solely on hearsay to revoke
probation violates due process); Thompson v. State, 626 So. 2d
1023 (Fla. App. 1993) (" [p]robation cannot be revoked solely on
the basis of hearsay").
Contrary to the dictates of Section 77-18-1(12) (d) (iii) and
due process as set forth in Gacrnon, Morrissev, Peronek, and other
cases, the persons who gave adverse information upon which the
allegations against Tate were based did not testify in the Order
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to Show Cause hearing.

Instead, the state used police officers

to provide hearsay and multiple hearsay accounts of information
they had encountered during their investigations.

Indeed, the

present case is similar to Peronek in that the revocation was
based solely on hearsay.

Tate was denied his right to meaningful

confrontation "when [the state] chose to make its case through
[the officers], who had only limited knowledge of [the
incidents]."

See Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299.

The hearsay evidence in this case was even less reliable
than that in Peronek.

In support of the forgery allegation, the

state presented only the testimony of Officer Boddy.

Boddy

recounted statements from four people, as well as multiple
hearsay attributed to a bank and a codefendant.

(R. 88:3-13)

The only evidence implicating Tate was Boddy's testimony
regarding a confession and other statements allegedly made by
Elizabeth Price, a codefendant.11

Because Price was a

codefendant who faced serious consequences, her statements
implicating Tate were constitutionally unreliable in the absence
of cross-examination.

See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,

135 (1968)(recognizing unreliability of a codefendant's
confession implicating defendant); Crawford v. United States, 212
U.S. 183, 204 (1909)(recognizing lack of reliability and
credibility of codefendant's statement implicating defendant).

11

Price was charged with several counts of forgery and
entered into a plea bargain dismissing at least one of the counts
and including a sentencing recommendation for probation.
(R. 88:
20-1)
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Boddy testified that Price confessed to him, saying that she
cashed six checks which "were handed to her by Tate."

(R. 88:11)

The United States Supreme Court recognized the unreliability of a
codefendant's confession which implicates a defendant in Bruton,
3 91 U.S. at 13 5.

After pointing out that in some contexts, a

limiting instruction will not undo the harm of admitting certain
evidence, the Court stated:
Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant are
deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.
Not only are the incriminations devastating to the
defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect,
a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand
and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony
carefully given the recognized motivation to shift
blame to others. [footnote omitted.] The
unreliability of such evidence is intolerably
compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does
not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination.
It was against such threats to a fair trial that the
Confrontation Clause was directed.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36 (footnote and citation omitted)
(emphasis added).

Due to the "substantial threat" to Bruton's

right to confrontation caused by the admission of a codefendant's
confession, the Court reversed Bruton's conviction even though
the jury had been instructed to disregard the statements about
Bruton.
Admission of Price's confession violated Tate's right to
confrontation and due process just as admission of the
codefendant's confession violated Bruton's right to confrontation
and due process.

The Bruton doctrine applies where a statement

is "powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the
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other defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly,
implicate the complaining defendant in the commission of the
crime."

State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1987).

The

confession Price allegedly made to Officer Boddy fits these
requirements since Boddy said Price told him Tate cashed six
checks.

See R. 88:11.

Hence, Price's confession implicating

Appellant was unreliable, as recognized by Bruton, and admitted
in violation of due process.
In addition, the remaining statements attributed to Price
were unreliable.

Price had approached Marks "and asked her to

fill out the check and she wouldn't do it, so [Price] said, I'll
get Lethron to do it."

(R. 88:12, 16)

Marks told Boddy that

Price wrote out the check and that Marks did not see Appellant
pass any checks.

(R.88:17, 9)

Marks also said that Price told

her that she had called Appellant and told him she would blame
everything on him. (R. 88:18)

This evidence suggests that Price

was at least the primary, if not the only, participant in the
forgeries.

Price's self-interest and obvious involvement in the

crime emphasizes the unreliability of any statements allegedly
made by her as well as the need for confrontation.

The trier of

fact needed to be able to observe Price to assess her credibility
and Tate needed to be able to cross-examine her to point out
weaknesses in her claims.
Additionally, Boddy's testimony about what Marks said Price
had said was multiple hearsay and inherently unreliable.
Admission of such unreliable multiple hearsay violated Tate's
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right to due process.
73 (Utah 1993) .

See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071-

In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a

report which contained double and triple hearsay indicating that
the defendant had sexually abused his niece was inherently
unreliable, presenting a "high probability for inaccuracy" and
therefore failed to meet the due process requirements of a
sentencing proceeding.

Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071.

The Court

referred to the multiple hearsay evidence in Johnson as "hearsay
and rumor."

Id. at 1073.

The error in admitting double and

triple hearsay is even more glaring in a probation violation
hearing, where the defendant has the right to confront adverse
witnesses.

Hence, Johnson applies to a probation violation

hearing and indicates that admission of the double and triple
hearsay attributed to Price violated Tate's right to due process.
The double and triple hearsay attributed to Price included:
(1) Boddy's testimony that Marks told him that she had knowledge,
apparently from Price, that Appellant "had passed a couple of
checks ... through Elizabeth Price" (R. 88:9),

(2) Boddy's

testimony that Marks told him that she "was privy to information
and the conversations between Lethron Tate and Elizabeth Price"
(R. 88:9),

(3) Boddy's summary of the information he received

from Marks, which Marks had received from Price:
that the checks were indeed stolen, they were being
passed and the blame was being passed back and forth as
to who was going to take the fall for this. Statements
by Lethron Tate to Elizabeth Price that, you know, he
wasn't going down alone, that everyone else was going
with us, as well, and this included Amanda Calouza, his
girlfriend.
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(R. 88:9-10); and (4) Boddy's testimony that Marks told him that
Price had told her that Price was going to blame everything on
Appellant (R. 88:18).
This testimony was inherently unreliable and essentially
rumor.

Tate was unable to cross-examine Marks about the details

of any "knowledge" she might have that he had passed checks.

It

is uncertain from Boddy's testimony regarding what Marks told him
whether Marks actually observed anything involving Tate, or was
merely told things by Price.

It is also uncertain whether Marks

overheard conversations between Price and Tate, or whether Price
simply relayed her version of any conversations they might have
had to Marks.

Boddy did not supply details as to how Marks

gained her information or specifics as to what she was told.
Tate was unable to subject the general statement that Marks told
the officer that she knew Tate was passing checks to any scrutiny
or obtain any details regarding her knowledge.

Appellant needed

to be able to cross-examine Marks to ascertain what, if anything,
Marks had observed.

Additionally, Tate was unable to question

Price regarding any statements she made to Marks or any claims
she might have made regarding their conversations.

Utilization

of this type of rumor and inherently unreliable hearsay violates
due process.

See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071.

Further hearsay attributable to Price was also unreliable.
See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36; Crawford, 212 U.S. at 204
(recognizing the lack of reliability and credibility of a
codefendant's statement implicating a defendant).
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Boddy

testified that Price originally told him that she did not know
who was committing the forgeries.

(R. 88:10-11)

She changed her

story only after she was informed that the officers had proof of
her involvement.

(R. 88:10, 17)

Once she knew the police were

on to her, Price "admitted to accepting two or three checks" that
she had gotten from Appellant while at Denny's.

(R. 88: 10)

She

also told Boddy that Tate was keeping the checks in his house or
his car, and that he cashed the checks through her.

(R. 88:11)

Price's admission to Boddy that she accepted two or three
checks from Tate and that Tate cashed the checks through her is
significantly different from Marks' statements that Price had the
checks, was filling them in, asked Marks to pass some checks, and
presented the checks to Appellant, who was at the cash register.
(R. 88:12-13, 16) 1 2 Her statements to the officer when compared
to her statements to Marks, suggest that when talking to the
Officer, Price minimized her own role and shifted the bulk of the

12

According to Boddy, Price told him that Tate had presented
three checks. (R. 88:11) After reviewing his police report, Boddy
changed Price's statement to be that she took six checks from
Appellant.
(R. 88:11)
This testimony coupled with the hearsay
attributable to Marks failed to establish how many checks were
passed and whether Tate or Price passed the checks.
Moreover,
Boddy testified that only five checks were relevant to the Order to
Show Cause. Boddy's confusion about the number of checks Price
admitted cashing coupled with his testimony that only five checks
were involved resulted in a confusing and uncertain record as to
what Tate might have done, i.e. whether he cashed the checks or
passed them, and the number of checks with which he might have been
involved. Boddy also testified that Price told him Amanda Calouza,
Tate's girlfriend, had passed five of the checks.
(R. 88:11)
Since only five of the checks were drawn on Woelfel's account, the
other three to seven checks referred to did nothing to establish a
forgery and were merely further unreliable hearsay placed before
the trier of fact.
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blame to Appellant.

Because Price was a codefendant who was

facing criminal charges arising out of the same incident as Tate,
her statements to Boddy were unreliable and should have been
subjected to cross-examination in order to pass constitutional
muster.
Without the hearsay, double hearsay and triple hearsay
attributable to Price, the state had no evidence linking
Appellant to the forgeries.

The statements Boddy attributed to

Woelfel and Thompson at most demonstrated that Woelfel had not
written the checks.

These statements failed to tie Tate to the

crime.
Additionally, the remaining evidence was unreliable and
should not have been admitted in the absence of confrontation.
Some of the statements Boddy attributed to Woelfel and Thompson
were multiple hearsay and inherently unreliable pursuant to
Johnson.

Boddy testified that Woelfel told him that new checks

had been mailed to her, removed from her mailbox and "passed all
over town" including at Denny's.

(R. 88:5)

This testimony was

dependent on the statements others made to Woelfel.

Boddy's

testimony that Thompson told him that Thompson "was told by the
banks" that Woelfel had not written the checks was also triple
hearsay which was made even more unreliable by the failure to
name anyone responsible for such statements.

Because such

statements were unreliable and essentially amounted to nothing
more than rumor, admission of the multiple hearsay violated due
process.

See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-73.
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In addition to the unreliability of the hearsay as outlined
above, Officer Boddy's hearsay testimony was unreliable and
admitted in violation of due process since it was essentially a
police report offered by the prosecution to establish its case.
See State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Utah 1983).

In

Bertul, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that police reports
which are offered by the state are unreliable and are
inadmissible under the rules of evidence.
On the other hand, police reports containing nonroutine information as to which the memory, perception,
or motivation of the reporter may raise a serious
question of reliability, are inadmissible.
Furthermore, statements by witnesses to a crime and
recorded by officers are not made in the regular course
of the witness' business and do not have the indicia of
reliability associated with routine and regularly
recorded entries upon which reliance is placed by an
organization.
[citations omitted.] Thus, the
"circumstances of their preparation" are not such "as
to indicate their trustworthiness," as required by Rule
63 (13) .
Furthermore, since police reports of the factual
events and details of a criminal case are generally
made for the purpose of successfully prosecuting a
crime, the reasons which might otherwise provide a
basis to assume reliability of such reports as business
records do not exist where police reports are offered
by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding.
Bertul, 664 P.2d at 118413 (emphasis added and citations
omitted).
Moreover, the Court recognized that admission of police
reports to prove the state's case can impinge upon the right to
confrontation.

Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185.

13

Rule 63(13) has been replaced by Rule 803(6), Utah Rules
of Evidence.
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Although the reports may not be readily describable as
"dripping with motivation to misrepresent," their
exclusion is more fundamentally explainable on the
ground that substantial rights under the confrontation
clause of the United States Constitution, and
especially the right to cross-examination, may be
severely prejudiced when the information in the report
calls into question the motivation and the accuracy of
perception, recall, the manner of language usage, or
the soundness of conclusions by the author of the
report.
[citation omitted.] It would be "error and
ordinarily reversible error to receive an exhibit
containing 'a neat condensation of the government's
whole case against the defendant'" in the form of a
police report for which there can be no effective
cross-examination.
[citations omitted.] We have long
ago forsaken the practice of allowing a person to be
convicted on the basis of out-of-court statements,
whether written or oral, of persons not subject to
cross-examination.
Id. at 1185 (citation omitted).

Although the confrontation issue

arose in Bertul during trial, the confrontation concerns
expressed in the opinion are likewise applicable to a probation
revocation proceeding where a defendant has a due process right
to confront the witnesses against him.
In the present case, Officer Boddy's report was made in
anticipation of litigation.

He had trouble remembering the

details of the report and reviewed it during the course of his
testimony.

Reliance on Boddy's testimony regarding the contents

of the report prejudiced Tate's right to confrontation and due
process since "the information in the report calls into question
the motivation and the accuracy of the perception, recall, the
manner of language usage, [and] the soundness of [Boddy's]
conclusions."

Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185.

The fact that Boddy's

testimony was a recitation of his police report further
demonstrates the unreliability of the hearsay testimony.
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The hearsay evidence offered in support of the first
allegation was likewise unreliable and admitted in violation of
Tate's right to confrontation and due process.

The state relied

solely on the hearsay testimony of two investigating officers to
present its case.
Reliance on an officer's testimony regarding the contents of
his file is unreliable pursuant to Bertul.
at 28-30.

See discussion supra

The officers' testimonies contained hearsay

conclusions that Tate had assaulted Hanson without specifics as
to whether the declarant actually observed the incident or, if
so, the declarant's ability to see the incident or precise
details of what occurred.

The information relayed by the

officers raised questions regarding the witnesses' memory,
accuracy of perception, motivation, and the correctness of the
conclusions which could not be explored since the witnesses were
not present.

Just as it would be reversible error to base a

conviction on a police report "containing

x

a neat condensation of

the government's whole case against the defendant'" (Bertul, 664
P.2d at 1185) (citations omitted)), it was reversible error to
revoke probation based solely on the officers' testimony which
was " xa neat condensation of the government's whole case against
the defendant.'"

See id.

Adding to the unreliability of the hearsay testimony
regarding the allegation that Appellant committed an aggravated
assault is the fact that the state had been unable to proceed at
either the preliminary hearing or a prior order to show cause
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hearing on the aggravated assault allegation.

(R. 49)

The

state's inability to proceed suggests that the state had witness
problems, and that the state would have been unable to establish
under oath the information the officers gathered in their
reports.

Indeed, the statements made to the officers were not

under oath or subjected to cross-examination, and despite three
hearings at which witnesses could have appeared, testimony had
not been taken from any of the purported witnesses.
Additionally, the officers' hearsay testimonies raised
questions as to the details of the incident and were based on
vague and conclusory statements made to them.
called police had not seen the fight.

The witness who

(R. 88:30)

Officer

Salazar testified that another unnamed witness told him that a
car had rapidly left the parking lot, and a restaurant employee
hat and shirt with the name tag "Josh" had fallen off the car.
(R. 88:30)

Without knowing the name of this witness and any

motive he might have to not be truthful, or the ability to crossexamine the witness as to details such as whether he saw the car
speed away and saw the shirt and hat on it, this testimony by
Salazar has no reliability.
There were two Joshes at the restaurant and Salazar talked
to one of them.

(R. 88:31)

He did not know Josh's last name.

(R. 88:31, 34, 35, 39) 1 4 According to Salazar, the Josh he
14

It is not clear whether Salazar's information came from
Josh Marquette, a possible codefendant, or Josh Wagstaff.
The
existence of the two Joshes and the uncertainty as to who might
have made the statements to Salazar further undermines the
reliability of the hearsay Officer Salazar attributed to "Josh."
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talked to told the officer that his friend "Tate" committed an
assault.

(R.88:31)

This is a conclusory statement which should

have been subjected to cross-examination.

The specifics of what

Josh actually said to Salazar are not clear; Salazar acknowledged
that Josh might have said "Lethron" and the other officer said he
was told that "Lee" was the perpetrator.

(R. 88:32, 35)

Cross-

examination of Josh was critical to establish whether he
indicated a specific name like Lethron or Tate, or a more general
name like Lee.

Cross-examination was also critical to determine

what exactly Josh had witnessed.

If Josh only witnessed the end

of the fight, his statement that Lee had assaulted Hanson was
meaningless since he was not in a position to know.

Moreover,

cross-examination of eyewitnesses is critical in an eyewitness
identification case to determine whether the identification
testimony is constitutionally reliable under the factors set
forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 (Utah 1986) and
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991).
Additionally, one of the Joshes, apparently Josh Marquette,
was present when the alleged assault occurred, may have sped away
in the car, and was a potential codefendant.

(R. 88:30, 39)

The

unreliability of codefendant statements further undermines the
reliability of Salazar7s hearsay testimony.

See discussion supra

at 21-23, 26-27.

Moreover, the officer conducted his interview with "Josh" over the
phone, so "Josh" was never even subjected to the credibility
assessment police officers apply when interviewing witnesses face
to face.
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The hearsay attributed to Josh Wagstaff was also unreliable
in the absence of cross-examination.

Although Officer Kent said

Wagstaff said he was outside, it is not clear whether Wagstaff
could clearly see the altercation, or whether he received his
information from others.

(R. 88:39, 35)

Tate was also unable to

subject Wagstaff's conclusion that Tate assaulted Hanson to
cross-examination.

In fact, when defense counsel asked Officer

Kent whether she asked the Joshes "who first hit who," the
officer simply reiterated that there had been a verbal exchange,
then the assault occurred.

(R. 88:39)

In response to defense

counsel's next question, the officer testified Josh said
Appellant hit Hanson one or two times.

(R. 88:40)

When asked

again whether she had asked the Joshes if Hanson initially took a
swing at Tate, the officer responded, "Yes.

Nobody said anything

other than that the assault on Mr. Tate (sic) came out of the
blue."

(R. 88:40)

This vague response fails to answer directly

whether Hanson swung at Tate.15

Appellant needed to be able to

cross-examine witnesses about what they actually saw and whether
they would have been able to see if Hanson or Josh Marquette had
taken a swing.
Finally, the statements of the alleged victim, Steve Hanson,
were unreliable and required cross-examination.

While Hanson

indicated to Officer Kent that a Black male hit him "out of
nowhere," he was somewhat vague as to what occurred.

15

(R. 88:39)

The officer's response could mean yes he asked and no one
responded to the question.
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This vagueness coupled with the question as to why Hanson had not
previously appeared under oath as a witness demonstrates the
unreliability of the hearsay supporting this allegation.
In addition, Kent's statement that Hanson picked Appellant
out of the photo spread is not sufficiently reliable.

The

vagaries of eyewitness identification are well documented.
Long/ 721 P.2d at 488-92; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-80.

See

Absent

the ability to cross-examine Hanson as to the facts relevant to
the Loner/Ramirez factors, the hearsay testimony regarding
Hanson's identification was not constitutionally reliable.

See

generally State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App.
1997)(trial court's failure to rule on admissibility of
eyewitness identification testimony is reversible error).
The right to confrontation is "one of the core elements of
the right to due process of law."

State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108,

1111 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted.)

The right allows an

individual the "opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness," but also of requiring
the witness to appear before the factfinder so that the
factfinder can assess demeanor, bias and credibility of the
witness.

Webb, 779 P.2d at 1111-12.

In the present case, Tate was deprived of his right to
confrontation and due process when the trial court did not make
the required finding of good cause for not allowing confrontation
prior to admitting the hearsay testimony.

In addition, the

record does not suggest that good cause existed for admitting
34

hearsay in this case.

Finally, even if good cause existed for

denying Tate his right to confrontation, admission of the hearsay
violated Appellant's right to due process since the hearsay
testimony was unreliable.

In this case where the state relied

solely on hearsay testimony to establish the probation violation
allegation, Appellant's right to confrontation and due process
was violated.16
CONCLUSION
Appellant's rights to confrontation and due process were
violated where the trial judge revoked his probation based solely
on hearsay and multiple hearsay testimony from police officers
who investigated the crimes alleged in the Order to Show Cause.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order
revoking his probation.
SUBMITTED this J?/<a*r day of April, 1999.

^ya^L^c t<£2y
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

STEPHANIE AMES
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

16

Reversal is required where the state relies solely on
hearsay to establish the allegations.
This is so because the
defendant is prejudiced by the admission of the hearsay evidence.
Tate was prejudiced in this case since without the hearsay
evidence, the state did not prove the allegations.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
1
officer
who
did
the
investigation
on
the
Allegation
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
2 No. 2 regarding the forgery charge. At this time I
3 would make the objection to the officer testifying.
STATE OF UTAH,
4 I understand that at an order to show cause hearing
Plaintiff,
5 the evidentiary rules do not necessarily apply;
Case No. 971900272
-vs6 however, the Constitution does still apply regarding
HEARING, 10-27-98
LETHROW D. TATE,
7 evidentiary hearings. Based on that, I would be
Defendant.
8 making a due-process objection. Pursuant to Layton
9 City v. Parrot (phonetic), probation revocation
10
hearings must be fundamentally fair so as to satisfy
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day
11
the
due-process clause. At a minimum it requires the
of October, 1998, at 8:30 o'clock a.m., this cause
12 right to confront and cross-examine adverse
came on for heaxmg before the HONORABLE DAVID YOUNi
13 witnesses.
District Court, without a jury, in the Salt Lake
This officer took witness statements from
Utah Court of Appeals
County Courthouse, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah.
15
other
individuals.
There is no possible way that I
;
FEi
i
\m
16 can attack and address the credibility of those
APPEARANCES:
17 witnesses' statements. In fact, one of the main
LANA TAYLOR
For the S t a t e :
Attorney at Law
Clerk or the C P 8 witnesses was an individual who was initially
19 charged, was the person actually caught red-handed
For the Defendant:
STEP1
Atto:BBOTBSTRia COURT
20 involved in passing checks. That person was the
Third Judicial District
21 individual who later tries to point the finger at my
22 client, Lethron Tate. Based on that there are a
Court T r a n s c r i b e r :
BILLIE WAY, CCT D E C 1 7
1998
23 number of credibility issues of motive, of bias, that
24 this officer would have no personal information to be
*
By
^
QWJ)
Deputy Cterk
25 able to testify to. I'm completely prohibited from
«•
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Page 1
1
PROCEEDINGS
2
THE COURT: Good morning. This is the
3 time set for an evidentiary hearing in the matter of
4 the State of Utah versus Lethron Tate. The case is
5 971900272.
6
Appearances, please.
7
MS. TAYLOR: Lana Taylor on behalf of the
8 State.
9
MS. AMES: Stephanie Ames appearing with
10 the Defendant, Lethron Tate, Your Honor.
11
THE COURT: Thank you. You may proceed.
12
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the State would
13 first call Officer - Detective Boddy to the stand.
14
RICHARD L. BODDY, called
15 as a witness on behalf of the State, after having
16 been duly sworn, testified as follows:
17
DIRECT EXAMINATION
18 BY MS. TAYLOR:
19
Q. Please state and spell your name for the
20 record.
21
A. Richard L. Boddy, B-o-d-d-y.
22
Q. Where are you currently employed?
23
A. West Valley City.
24
MS. AMES: Your Honor, excuse me for
25 objecting, but at this time I understand this is the
T»YT T I T ? n r A \ r

m~*nr%
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*% ^ A
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Page 3
1 any ability, based on their putting on this officer,
2 to confront the necessary evidence that would be
3 needed here, Your Honor.
4
THE COURT: Thank you. Your objection is
5 overruled. This is a civil proceeding, and we'll let
6 the State proceed.
7
MS. TAYLOR: where are you currently
8 employed?
9
A. West Valley City Police.
10
Q. In what capacity?
11
A. I'm a Detective.
12
Q. And are you assigned to any particular
13 unit?
14
A. Yes, I am assigned to Property Squad.
15
Q. And in that capacity did you investigate
16 a forgery complaint at Denny's Restaurant?
17
A. Yes.
18
Q. Where is that located?
19
A. That's located in West Valley City at
20 2222 West 3500 South.
21
Q. And on what day did you investigate a
22 matter there?
23
A. The original complaint was filed on
24 February 12th, 1998. My investigation started
25 shortly thereafter.

MAicv. IAIH
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Page 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
\\6
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q, A n d what steps did y o u take to
investigate a forgery that occurred at Denny's?
A. Well, first I collected — obviously take
the checks that had been passed at Denny's. A n d I
collected those from D e n n y ' s and from other
collection resources.
Q. H o w m a n y checks did y o u collect?
A. Twenty-seven.
Q. A n d do all o f those checks contain the
same name, same account?
A. Negative. There were t w o different
accounts involved, t w o different banks involved, and
t w o different owners o f the checking accounts.
Q. Okay. A n d w h o were the t w o different
owners on those checks?
A. Well, on the first batch, it w a s Antonio
C. Ascencio. A n d o n the second group THE COURT: H o w do y o u spell the last
name?
THE WITNESS: A-S-C-e-n-C-i-O.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
THE WITNESS: And then the second group
o f checks w a s Brenda Lee Woelfel, W-o-e-l-f-e-1.
MS. TAYLOR: And did y o u have occasion to
speak with either one o f those individuals?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 6
status o f those checks?
A. The status o f those checks? W e verified
that those were stolen, as well, but w e never really
- and this batch o f checks is not an issue in this
hearing because w e never were able to establish w h o
passed that batch.
Q. Okay, thank you. H o w many checks are
there in the first batch in the name o f Brenda?
A. With Brenda, there's three, four ~ I
have five o f them here.
Q. Okay. A n d under what circumstances did
y o u learn that those checks had been passed?
A. Information came to u s from the manager
at D e n n y ' s and as well as the victim that they were
receiving the checks from collection agencies.
Q. D o y o u recall w h o that was, w h o the
manager w a s that y o u spoke to?
A. I think his name w a s Larry Thompson.
There w a s quite a f e w people involved here, s o it's
kind o f confusing to try to keep it all very straight
here.
MS. AMES: Your Honor, I would just
interject, there appears to be another witness in the
courtroom. I'm not sure if (Inaudible) charges
involves this charge or not, but I'll invoke the

Page 5
Page 7
1
A. I did with Brenda Woelfel.
1 Exclusionary Rule.
2
Q. A n d what information did she give y o u
2
MS. TAYLOR: And, Your Honor, he is not
3 regarding these checks?
I 3 involved in the case that's presently being heard.
4
A. She had received the checks in her mail,
4
THE COURT: o k a y . Well, the Exclusionary
5 and the checks were subsequently taken out o f the
5 Rule has not been asked for until n o w , s o witnesses
6 mailbox. A n d shortly after that these checks were
6 could b e present. If there are witnesses that y o u
7 being passed all over town, and quite a f e w o f them
7 anticipate calling hereafter, they should be observed
8 at Denny's.
8 and sent out o f the courtroom.
9
Q. A n d did y o u ever show her those checks
9
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
10 that y o u have in your possession n o w ?
10
THE WITNESS: It w a s Larry Thompson. H e
11
A. Yes, w e had statements from her saying
j 11 w a s the manager o f the D e n n y ' s in West Valley at 2 2 2 2
12 that she w a s not the author o f those checks.
12 West.
13
Q. In speaking with Brenda, did she ever
13
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you. A n d in speaking
14 with him, what were the circumstances under which he
14 state that she had given anyone permission to use her
15 had discovered the forged checks?
15 name on those checks?
16
A. H e w a s told b y the banks, and because o f
16
A. N o . A n d , again, I refer to the
17
the
affidavits
that were filed b y the victim on the
17 statements that she wrote out saying that she w a s not
18 checks, in this case Brenda Woelfel, that these
18 the author, which also included a statement from her
19
checks were not again authored b y herself and that
j 19 that she authorized n o one. Even, in fact, it w a s a
20 she at n o time ever issued, wrote or authored any o f
20 brand n e w batch that hadn't even been received b y
21 the checks at the D e n n y ' s .
J2l herself yet.
22
Q. A n d s o were those checks returned to the
122
Q. Okay. D i d y o u ever speak with the second
23 D e n n y ' s Restaurant unpaid?
!23 - the owner o f the second batch o f checks?
24
A. Y e s .
24
A. No.
25
Q. And what is the amount - the total
25
Q. D i d y o u receive any information about the

Page 4 - Page 7

Page 8
1 amount on the checks?
2
A. Let's see...
3
Q. Or how much is each check written out
4 for?
5
THE COURT: Just recite the number — or
6 the amount for each check.
7
THE WITNESS: Okay. We have $70.33,
8 59.87, 51.76, 80.25 and 80.50.
9
MS. TAYLOR: And in speaking with
10 Mr. Thompson, did he tell any circumstances which led
11 to a suspect?
12
A. He did, and several names actually came
13 up, and that's because checks were passed at a
14 certain time when certain employees were present.
15
Q. And did he give you the name of those
16 employees?
17
A. He did. He gave the names of Julie Marks
18 (phonetic), Elizabeth Price, Lethron Tate. And those
19 were the three employees, and then there was another
20 person that was involved by the name of Amanda
21 Calouza (phonetic) that is not an employee of
22 Denny's, or at least was not.
23
Q. Did you have occasion to speak with Julie
24 Marks?
25
A. I am sorry. What was that?

Page 10
1 and the blame was being passed back and forth as to
2 who was going to take the fall for this. Statements
3 by Lethron Tate to Elizabeth Price that, you know, he
4 wasn't going to go down alone, that everybody else
5 was going to go with us, as well, and this included
6 Amanda Calouza, his girlfriend.
7
Q. Did you speak with Elizabeth Price?
8
A. I did.
9
Q. And what information did she give you?
10
A. Well, she at first denied any
11 involvement. And then when we presented the checks
12 that she accepted, she changed and recanted her
13 story,. And then in a post-Miranda statement, she
14 admitted to accepting two or three of the checks.
15 And I say two or three because she wasn't exactly
16 sure how many she had gotten, and that she had gotten
17 those directly from Lethron at Denny's, and that she
18 had received money in return for those checks.
19
Q. She took money — I am sorry. You said
20 she took money. Was that funds (Inaudible) Denny's
21 still?
22
A. She did. I think she received $20 on the
23 first two, and then it went up from there. She got
24 at least double that on the last check.
25
Q. And did Ms. Price tell you where those

Page 9
9
Page 11
1
Q. Did you speak with Julie Marks?
1 checks come from?
2
A. I did.
2
A. I am sorry. She what?
3
Q. What information did she give you?
3
Q. Where the checks initially come from?
4
A. She said and she also wrote it in her
' 4
A. Well, she knew that Lethron Tate was
5 statement that she was approached by Elizabeth Price
5 keeping them either in the house or in his vehicle,
6 to cash a check and that she also had knowledge that
6 and he was the one that actually came to her when she
7 Lethron Tate had passed a couple of the checks there
7 cashed out for the meals at Denny's.
8 through Elizabeth Price.
8
Q. And did Ms. Price tell you who had filled
9
Q. Did Julie Marks see Lethron Tate pass any
9 out those checks?
10 checks?
10
A. She said specifically three of these here
11
A. No, she didn't.
11 that are in the plastic bags, that those are the ones
12
Q. What information did Julie Marks tell you
12 that Lethron actually filled out, and the others he
13 that led you to believe that those checks had been —
113 had given to Amanda Calouza, his girlfriend, and she
14 that Lethron Tate had participation in the passing of
! 14 passed five of those.
15 the checks?
15
Q. And did she state that she had seen
16 (Inaudible) herself?
16
A. She was privy to the information and the
17
A. Give me one second here. I am referring
17 conversations between Lethron Tate and Elizabeth
18 to my statement here, my report in this case. She
18 Price. She had become a roommate with Elizabeth
19 said she took a total of six checks. All of these
19 Price and was present during conversations at
20 checks were handed to her by Tate. And on one
20 Elizabeth Price's house and Lethron Tate's house in
21 occasion, she took one check from Calouza, which
21 Salt Lake.
22 included the meal and cash back.
22
Q. Could you tell the Court what information
23
I am sorry. There is quite a few papers
23 you had about those conversations you had?
24 here and lots of reports and addendums here. Would
J 24
A. In summary, the conversations were that
25 the checks were indeed stolen, they were being passed
25 you ask me the last question?

BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943
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1
Q. Did Miss Price ever tell you that she had
1 statement. February 12th, she said she got back
2 seen Lethron fill out the checks?
2 about $30.
3
A. I have to go to her witness statement
3
Q. And what — I am sorry.
4 here.
4
A. And then she got another check here, and
5
Q. How about do you recall mentioning,
5 she says, "I gave him $60 of that check," and she
6 during the course of your investigation, who had
6 kept the balance.
7 actually filled out the checks?
7
Q. And what did Miss Price say that the rest
8
A. If I recall -- and this is from the
8 of the money from those two cashed checks went to?
9 interview with Elizabeth Price - she was presented
9
A. The rest of the money was kept by
10 the checks by Lethron, but I don't think she ever
10 Lethron.
11 actually saw him sit and fill the checks out. He
11
MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions
12 just presented the checks to her.
12 of this witness.
13
Q. Did Miss Price ever state that she was in
13
THE COURT: cross-examination.
14
MS. AMES: Thank you, Your Honor.
14 possession of any of the blank checks from
15
CROSS-EXAMINATION
15 Miss Woelfal's account?
16 BY MS. AMES:
16
A. She was - according to Julie Marks, she
17
Q. First a couple of questions for
17 had been in possession of a couple of those checks.
18 clarification, Officer. You were reading over a
18 And I referred to Julie Marks' written statement.
19 statement when you said that she gave him $60 and
19 And she said that, "Elizabeth Price had two checks in
20
kept the rest for herself. What document are you
20 her possession at the time she wanted me to write out
121 referring to?
21 the check. Lethron was working as a server that
22
A. A statement written by Elizabeth Price on
22 evening, and they wrote out of the checks, and then
23 3-31 of f 98.
23 went up to the register and gave Lethron the checks
24
Q. Okay, thank you.
24 and he then gave her the money for them."
25
Officer, you received a number of
25
Q. So Miss Price had filled out the checks
Page 13 I
1
2
3
4
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and given them to Lethron (Inaudible)?
A. And then she saw her give Lethron the
check, and Lethron gave the money (Inaudible) checks.
MS. AMES: (Inaudible) Officer, where
were you reading that last statement from?
THE WITNESS: Statement from the Julie
Marks dated...
MS. TAYLOR: Is that a handwritten
statement?
A. There's one here that's March 3rd of
'98.
Q. And that is a statement that Miss Marks
gave to you?
A. I am sorry.
Q. Is that a statement that Miss Marks
filled out for you?
A. Yes.
Q. What are the names that are showing on
the checks?
A. All of the names that are signed on here
were the name of the person who held the account, and
that would be Brent Woelfal.
Q. How much money did Miss Price tell you
that she received from those checks?
A. Again, I'm going to refer to her

1
2
3
4
, 5
j6
7
| 8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
117
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 15
different statements from Elizabeth Price; is that
correct?
A. I - two.
Q. You spoke to her on two different
occasions or did you speak to her more frequently
than those two times?
A. We spoke more frequently than just the
two, but she actually wrote out two statements.
Q. And in the first statement that she gave
you she wrote that she had been working at Denny* s
for five years and wasn't aware of anything -- of who
was writing the checks; is that correct?
A. That's true.
Q. And then shortly after that you received
a statement from Julie Marks; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And Julie, in her statement - how many
statements - let me go back and ask how many
statements did you get from Julie Marks?
A. I have two statements.
Q. Okay. Both of those look like they are
two-paged, handwritten statements; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And her first statement she told you that
Elizabeth had approached her and asked her to fill
Page 12 - Page 15
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1 out the check and she wouldn't do it, so Elizabeth
1 statement. No.
2 said, "I'll get Lethron to do it"; is that correct?
2
Q. Okay. So there's no specific information
3
A. That's what she wrote here.
3 as to what contents of those conversations were; is
4
Q. But Julie didn't actually observe Lethron
4 there?
5 filling out any checks; is that correct?
5
A. I have to answer that with no.
6
A. No, not in that statement.
6
Q. Okay. And Julie also told you that or
7
Q. Did she at any time tell you that she
7 it's also written in her statement that, "Liz had
8 observed Lethron filling out any checks?
8 called her and said that she had just talked to
9
A. One moment, please. No.
9 Lethron and she had told him that she was going to
10
Q. What Julie said that she did observe was
10 blame everything on him, and he had said, 'what?',
11 that Elizabeth had handed an already filled out check
11 and she said what else was she to do, she has four
12 to Lethron who was at the cash register and that he
12 kids. He hung up on her."
13 gave her cash for that check; is that correct?
13
A. That's in her statement
14
A. Are you referring to the statement with
14
Q. Now, going to Elizabeth Price, because
15 3-3 of'98?
115 she's the individual who tells you that Lethron is
16
Q. Yes, and in any other statements that you
16 actually involved in this and gives you some specific
17 have (Inaudible) to the best of your recollection.
17 information that he is involved in passing these
18
A. No, she said that Elizabeth had handed
18 checks; is that correct?
19
A. Are you referring to Elizabeth?
19 checks to Lethron and he cashed them at that time,
20 and that's on March 3rd of '98, was her statement.
20
Q. Uh-huh, Elizabeth Price.
21
Q. And what she said was that Lethron was
21
A. Yes.
22 working as a server that evening, Liz then wrote out
22
Q. And you first had a statement with
23 the checks and went up to the register and gave
23 Elizabeth and she says she doesn't know anything
24 Lethron the check and he gave her the money for them; 24 about it?
25 is that correct?
25
A. That's true.
Page 17
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1
A. Yes.
1
Q. And then you find out from Julie that
2
Q. Okay. She did not overhear any
2 she's called Julie and told her that she wants to
3 know if Julie is the one who's telling on her pretty
3 conversation at the register at that time; did she?
4 much. Is that what Julie tells you?
4
A. Not when -- not at that time when he
5
A. Yes.
5 actually gave the money back for the check.
6
Q. And Julie's quite concerned about —
6
Q. She didn't observe Lethron evaluating the
7 about Liz at that point; is that correct?
7 check or questioning Elizabeth as to whether this was
8 her check, whether she had authorization to pass that
8
A. That's true.
9 check; is that correct?
9
Q. And then Elizabeth also tells her that
10
A. She didn't hear — I don't know what the
|10 she's talked to Lethron, and she tells Lethron she is
11 going to blame it on him; is that correct?
11 conversation was between the two of them when they
12
A. Well, I got just what, on that
12 passed that particular checks.
13 conversation, that she wasn't going to take, yeah,
13
Q. Okay. But all that you are aware of was
14 the entire criminal charges.
14 that she observed Lethron accepting a check that was
15
Q. Well, specifically what Julie told you
15 written out to Denny's for cash and giving the amoimt
16 was that, "Liz had called again and said she had just
16 of cash that was — that was equivalent to that
117 talked to Lethron and she told him she was going to
I
17 check; is that correct?
118
blame
everything
on
him.
He
said,
'What?',
and
she
18
A. Yes.
119 said what else was she to do, she has four kids."
j
19
Q. Now, Julie also told you that she was
20
A. That's what she wrote in her statement.
20 privy to some conversation between Elizabeth and
21
Q. And it is after that point that Elizabeth
21 Lethron; is that also correct?
22 points the finger at Lethron; is that correct?
22
A. That's true.
23
A. I am sorry. Say that again.
23
Q. But she didn't tell you anything about
24
Q. It is after that point that Elizabeth
24 the contents of those conversations; did she?
25 points the finger at Lethron, she talks to you folks
25
A. No, she didn't write it on her
BILLIE WAY CCT KM -164-4Q41
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again?
A. She did.
Q. Okay. A n d that's the time that she tells
y o u that he is actually involved in it, he's the one
w h o got the checks and she's just gotten some money
from it; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. A n d she had criminal charges against her
at that time; is that correct?
A. She did. She admitted to accepting or
passing three o f the checks.
Q. A n d a plea negotiation w a s worked out
with her based upon s o m e o f statements that she told
the police; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. A n d based o n that, to your understanding,
she w a s given s o m e reduced charges and some
sentencing benefits because o f that; is that
correct?
A. I don't think the charges were reduced.
I think that they dropped one, she pled to t w o or
something along that line. It wasn't necessarily
reduced in severity because they were just Third
Degree Felonies at any rate.
Q. Okay. S o they dismissed at least one

Page 2 2
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A. Y e s .
Q. A n d at that time, in your interview with
her then, did she admit to receiving any checks from
Lethron?
A. Yes, she said that - she admitted that
she accepted t w o checks from Lethron Tate (Inaudible)
Lethron girlfriend, A m a n d a Calouza, w a s present.
Q. A n d in those transactions where she
accepted those t w o checks, w a s that while M i s s Price
w a s e m p l o y e d at the restaurant?
A. Y e s .
Q. A n d what did M i s s Price do in return for
those checks that Lethron had given her?
A. I f m not sure I understand.
Q. What w a s the procedure that she followed
w h e n Lethron gave her the checks?
A. She cashed the checks and received a
portion o f the m o n i e s , and then the balance w a s given
to Lethron.
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. I have n o further
questions.
THE COURT: Anything further o f this
witness?
MS. AMES: No.
THE COURT: Thank you. Y o u m a y step
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Page 2 3
charge, m a y b e s o m e other charges and she pled to some 1 down.
others —
2
Your next witness?
A. Uh-huh.
3
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, if I m a y step
Q. - all at the same level; is that
4 outside (Inaudible).
correct?
5
GILBERT SALAZAR, called as a
A. Y e s .
6 witness on behalf o f the State, after having been
Q. A n d the State also m a d e s o m e sentencing
7 duly sworn, testified as follows:
recommendations for probation; is that correct?
8
THE CLERK: Would y o u please spell and
A. Y e s .
9 state your name for the record.
10
THE WITNESS: Gilbert Salazar,
MS. AMES: I have n o further questions.
J11 S-A-L-A-Z-A-R.
THE COURT: A n y redirect?
THE COURT: Yes.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
I 12
MS. AMES. Your Honor, I w o u l d make an
BY MS. TAYLOR:
I 113
14 objection and m o t i o n to dismiss the Allegation N o . 1,
Q. When did y o u first speak with Elizabeth
! 15 w h i c h I understand this witness will be testifying
Price?
16 to, based upon State v . Bricky (phonetic). This w a s
A. I have it as the 4th o f March, 1 9 9 8 .
Q. A n d do y o u recall w h i c h information —
I 17 a probation violation that w a s charged and filed
y o u stated that she filled out a statement. Is that
| 18 against Mr. Tate. W e had an evidentiary hearing on
19 it I believe in A u g u s t and the Court at that time
the same o n e that y o u were referring to earlier?
A. Y e s , she filled out a statement saying
20 dismissed the order t o s h o w cause based upon the
21 State not having any witnesses or evidence to proceed
that she had n o knowledge about anybody or anything
22 in that matter. U n d e r State v . Bricky, the due
or any involvement in the checks.
23 process clause o f the Utah Constitution prohibits
Q. When w a s the second time that y o u spoke
24
refiling a criminal charge without a further showing
with M i s s Price?
25 o f additional evidence or other good cause. This
D i d y o u speak with her o n March 31st?
/^^r
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witness was not known at that evidentiary hearing.
There is no additional evidence that's being
presented today (Inaudible).
THE COURT: Are you suggesting that a
criminal charge w a s filed at that time, that when
there was an order to show cause, that that's a
criminal charge being filed?
MS. AMES: Your Honor, I'm making the
analogous argument that the allegation is equivalent
to a criminal charge. The Defendant faces the
possibility of incarceration, loss of his liberty.
A n d subsequently filing the same allegation when that
w a s adjudicated previously and dismissed by the Court
is inappropriate.
THE COURT: And I need to be sure that
I T m understanding accurately what you are saying.
That wasn't adjudicated by the Court because it w a s
dismissed for failure to prosecute; right?
MS. AMES: That's correct
THE COURT: okay. So it wasn't
adjudicated.
MS. AMES: I apologize for using the
wrong term.
THE COURT: okay. The second thing is
that this is not filed as a criminal charge. This is
Page 25
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filed as a civil matter in violation - it alleges
criminal conduct which constitutes violation of his
probation. But this w a s filed as an order to show
cause. S o the first order to show cause was simply
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the same
allegation n o w is raised in a follow-up or second
order to show cause. A n d the matter has never been
considered on its merits. Is that an accurate
statement?
MS. AMES: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: okay. All right.
MS. AMES: However, I would just state
that even though this is considered by the Court as a
civil procedure, the defendant's constitutional
rights of due process still apply, and I'm basing m y
argument on that.
THE COURT: (Inaudible) there has been no
prejudice that that's occurred to him.
MS. AMES: Well, Your Honor, the
situation that is somewhat similar in Bricky is that
although they had put on some witnesses, there was
another one w h o w a s not put on the first hearing w h o
w a s later put on the second one who would have been
available in the first one, as well. The Supreme
Court in that case found that there was no additional
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evidence that was available to the court at that
preliminary hearing that had not been available
beforehand.
THE COURT: Now, Bricky is a criminal
proceeding; right?
MS. AMES: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT. So it is not an order to show
cause, it is not something that the standard of
evidence is a preponderance?
MS. AMES: But an order to show cause is
still a critical stage of the proceedings for the
defendant. The United States Supreme Court and State
Supreme Court have both stated that the
Constitutional provisions, the right to confrontation
and the right to due process, apply to probation
revocation hearings.
THE COURT: O k a y MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, if I may?
According to m y file when the State was here on
August 11th, then at that time the State (Inaudible)
proceed. They moved for that to be stricken. The
Court granted that. A n d there is a notation here
that AP&P w a s entitled to the refile that if there
are any n e w charges that are brought up. M y
understanding is that it was with the — the

Page 2 7
1 allegation w a s withdrawn by the State and the Court
2 allowed that and also allowed that allegation to be
3 refiled at another time.
4
THE COURT: The Minute Entry of the Court
5 says that, "Ms. A m e s states that the underlying case
6 in this matter was unable to proceed to preliminary
7 hearing because witnesses were not available, and the
8 preliminary hearing in that matter was continued and
9 the Defendant released from custody on that day."
j 10 That's separate from m y case. That is a matter
11 proceeding in another criminal matter. "Mr. Harnets
12 (phonetic) states that he is unable to proceed today
! 13 because no one from AP&P was present," and files a
14 motion for a continuance. "The Court dismisses the
15 order to show cause as the State is not ready to
16 proceed at this time. The Court orders the Defendant
17 released forthwith from custody. The same prior
18 terms and conditions of probation will apply. The
19 Defendant's ordered to report to AP&P."
20
That doesn't look to me like there w a s
21 any prejudice in terms of anything that was conducted
22 in that hearing. The Court simply dismissed the case
23 for the State's failure to proceed. That doesn't
24 mean that the State is barred from re-filing and
25 re-proceeding on the same matter.
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1
So your motion in that regard is denied.
2
DIRECT EXAMINATION
3 BY MS. TAYLOR:
4
Q. Where are you currently employed?
5
A. Salt Lake City Police Department.
6
Q. Were you so employed on April 29th of
7 this year?
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. Did you have an occasion to investigate
10 an assault on that day?
11
A. On that evening, yes.
12
Q. Okay. Approximately what time was that?
13
THE COURT: what was that date again?
14
MS. TAYLOR: April 29th (Inaudible).
15
THE COURT: April 29th?
16
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.
17
THE COURT: Thank you.
18
MS. TAYLOR: Approximately what time
19 (Inaudible) the matter (Inaudible)?
20
A. I got the call a little after 10:00
21 o'clock.
22
Q. Okay. And what location did you respond
23 to?
24
A. To nth South 2100 - 1300 East 2100
25 South, the Kentucky Fried Chicken parking lot.
Page 29
1
Q. And in the course of your investigation,
2 what did you do?
3
A. I arrived there and I located a man that
4 was down on the ground on the north side of the
5 restaurant in the parking lot. And he was —
6 appeared to be beat up quite a bit.
7
Q. Did you speak with him?
8
A. I tried to talk to him, but he could not
9 talk very much because he was so injured.
10
Q. Okay. Did you eventually get his name?
11
A. Yes. His name was Steven Hanson.
12
Q. And what type of injuries did it appear
13 that he was suffering from?
14
A. Facial and head injury. He did say
15 something to me at the scene, if I can go back to
16 that?
17
Q. Sure.
18
A. He said that a black guy beat him up.
19
Q. Okay. What specifically - specifically
20 what type of injuries did you see on his face?
21
A. Injuries around his face, eyes. Blood
22 was coming out of his nose, ears. And he did have
23 some injuries to the back of his head.
24
Q. Okay. And what steps did you take to
25 investigate this matter?
.-»»» T i r TIT A v
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1
A. After medical, I responded and took him
2 to the hospital. I talked to the witness or the
3 person who called the police (Inaudible). This
4 person said he did not see the assault. He just saw
5 the person down on the ground and a car leaving quite
6 rapidly from the parking lot.
7
Q. Okay. Did you speak with any other
8 witnesses at that time?
9
A. Well, I talked to the personnel at
10 Kentucky Fried Chicken that were there in the
11 restaurant. Also by talking to them, I found out the
12 name of a person that may have been at the scene of
13 the assault.
Q. And how did you discover that?
14
A. When this - the witness — the person
15
16 who reported the incident to us said that when the
17 car left rapidly from the parking lot, some clothing
18 fell off the car.
Q. And what was that?
19
A. And it was Kentucky Fried Chicken hat and
20
21 shirt.
22
Q. Okay. And was any information regarding
23 that shirt discovered?
24
A. Yes, there was a name tag named "Josh."
Q. Did you contact anyone or speak with
25

|
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1 anyone by the name of Josh?
A. Yes. While I was at the hospital waiting
2
3 to interview the victim, I was able to contact Josh,
4 the employee at Kentucky Fried Chicken.
Q. And what (Inaudible) last name was?
5
A. I don't recall offhand.
6
Q. Okay. And what information did he give
7
8 you?
A. He told me that a friend of his named
9
10 Tate was the one that assaulted the victim there at
j
11 Kentucky Fried Chicken, but he did not have any more
12 information on this - on the suspect.
|
Q. Did he witness the assault?
|
13
14
A. Yes.
Q. Did he tell you how it started?
15
A. He said - Let's see. I am talking about
16
17 independent recollection on this. He said the victim
18 came out and there were some words exchanged and the
19 victim was assaulted by the suspect. And Josh told
20 me over the phone that he kept on telling the suspect
21 to stop beating him.
22
MS. TAYLOR: All right. Thank you.
I have no further questions.
23
THE COURT: Cross-examination.
24
25
Page 2 8 - P a g e 31
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1
CROSS-EXAMINATION
2 BY MS. AMES:
3
Q. Officer, actually what he told you was
4 that the person's first name was Lethron; correct?
5 That was the conversation that you had with Josh?
6
A. I don't recall (Inaudible) my
7 independent...
8
Q. But he was only able to give you one
9 name?
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. He didn't know any other information on
12 that individual?
13
A. Actually he did. He knew approximately
14 where he lived, but he didn't know any more
15 information. I don't think he really wanted me — to
16 tell me anything.
17
Q. Okay. So that's all the information that
18 you obtained from that individual; is that correct?
19
A. Yes, Ma'am.
20
Q. You did not make any more specific
21 identification of the individual that he was
22 referring to; is that correct?
23
A. That's correct.
24
MS. AMES: Nothing further, Your Honor.
25
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the State has no
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1 case. The first thing that I did was attempt to
2 contact the witnesses involved. The first witness I
3 spoke with was Josh Marquette (phonetic). I am not
4 sure if that's pronounced correctly. I spoke with
5 him up at the Kentucky Fried Chicken where this
6 incident happened. When I spoke with him, he
7 explained to me that he and some friends were
8 standing outside of the restaurant in the parking
9 lot, and that our victim had been in the restaurant
10 and came out. There was some words exchanged over a
11 Jazz game that had just happened. They were making
12 comments back and forth. And that a young man named
13 Lee or Lethron, is what he knew, that was a friend of
14 an ex-co-worker, who was also present, and that he
15 had gone over and that he had assaulted our victim.
16
Q. All right. Did he have any other
17 information about the incident?
18
A. What he told me is that and that this Lee
19 lived with a young lady named Amanda Calouza.
20
Q. Okay. And what - how did he describe
21 the assault that occurred?
22
A. He wasn't real detailed about what had
23 occurred. He just said that there was an assault,
24 that he had seen him a couple of times, that he just
25 whacked him real hard and the kid went down.
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1 more questions of this witness.
2
MS. AMES: Nor I.
3
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You
4 may step down.
5
(Discussion off the record)
6
KELLY KENT, called as a
7 witness on behalf of the State, after having been
8 duly sworn, testified as follows:
9
THE CLERK: will you please state
10 and spell your name for the record?
11
THE WITNESS: My name is Kelly Kent.
12 K-e-H-y K-e-n-t.
13
DIRECT EXAMINATION
14 BY MS. TAYLOR:
15
Q. Where are you currently employed?
16
A. Salt Lake City Police Department.
17
Q. In what capacity?
18
A. Homicide Detective.
19
Q. Did you investigate an assault that
20 occurred on April 29th at Kentucky Fried Chicken on
21 13 th East?
22
A. I did.
23
Q. What steps did you take in the
24 investigation?
25
A. I was assigned the follow-up on this
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1
Q. The suspect is (Inaudible)?
2
A. Uh-huh. And that the victim went down.
3
Q. Okay. Did you speak with any other
4 witnesses (Inaudible)?
5
A. Yes. I also spoke with Josh Wagstaff,
6 who was also an employee up at (Inaudible). He said
7 basically the same thing, that they were outside,
8 there were some words exchanged and that Lee, as he
9 knew him, had assaulted Mr. Hanson, our victim.
10
Q. All right. Did he add anything further?
11
A. He added the same thing, that Lee — he
12 didn't know his last name, but that he lived with or
13 was the boyfriend of Amanda Calouza.
14
Q. Okay. Did he give any description of
15 injuries or what happened to the victim?
16
A. He just said that he was hurt real bad
17 and that he was unconscious.
18
Q. Okay. Did you speak with the victim in
19 this case?
20
A. I did.
21
Q. And what information did he give you?
22
A. Initially when I spoke with him he had
23 just been released from the hospital. He was staying
24 up at his folks' home. He told me the injuries that
25 he had sustained, that he was in the hospital
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1 unconscious for some time due to what he called a
2 brain hemorrhage. He couldn't remember a whole lot
3 about this case other than there was some exchanges
4 of words and that out of nowhere this black male that
5 was in the parking lot hit him, and that's what he
6 remembered of the assault.
7
Q. Was he able to identify who the person
8 was that hit him?
9
A. Yes, he was. He did say that he did get
10 a good enough look at him that he can remember what
11 he looked like.
12
Q. And how was he able to identify Lethron
13 Tate?
14
A. The identification was done through a six
15 photo photospread.
16
Q. And (Inaudible)?
17
A. I did.
18
Q. And who did he pick out (Inaudible)?
19
A. He picked out Lethron Tate.
20
Q. Out of the photospread that you put
21 together?
22
A. Yes, he did.
23
Q. Is there any other information
24 (Inaudible) criminal investigation?
25
A. What he said about when he looked at the

1
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1 photospread is he picked out Lethron Tate but said
2 that his hair is different. The photospread that I
3 had, the photo that I used, was a booking photo from
4 January of 1997. Mr. Tate's hair had been shaved
5 during this photo, so all six of the photos had a
6 bald head. And Mr. Tate had hair at that time of the
7 assault.
8
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you.
9
No further questions.
10
THE COURT: Cross-examination.
11
MS. AMES: Thank you, Your Honor.
12
CROSS-EXAMINATION
13 BY MS. AMES:
14
Q. Do you have a copy of that photo lineup
15 that you used?
16
A. I do. I have the original.
17
MS. AMES: May I approach, Your Honor?
18
19

THE COURT: You may.
THE WITNESS: (Handing).

20
MS. AMES: What you provided me is six
21 different photographs (Inaudible); is that correct?
22
A. That's correct
23
Q. And these were photographs that you
24 showed Mr. Hanson?
25
A. Yes, those are the actual photographs.
UTTTTT7WAV P P T
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1
Q. And how did you present these to
2 Mr. Hanson?
3
A. Just as you see them. They are folded
4 over. There are no names showing. The numbers 1
5 through 6 are present up in the corner.
6
Q. Okay. What discussions did you have with
7 Mr. Hanson before you showed him these photos, if
8 any?
9
A. I explained to him that I was going to
10 show him six photographs similar in appearance and
11 asked him if he would look through them. And if he
12 did so if he recognized the person that he believed
13 to be the person who assaulted him to point that
14 out. And that's all that was said.
15
Q. Okay. And what was the date again that
16 you (Inaudible) these photographs to Mr. Hanson?
17
A. It was May 20th.
18
Q. Approximately a month after the incident;
19 is that correct?
20
A. Yes.
21
Q. Did you have any further discussions with
22 Mr. Hanson as to what words were exchanged, the
23 specifics of what happened or have you provided
24 everything that you recall him telling you?
25
A. Yeah. He was somewhat vague on
Page 39
1 remembering exactly what was said in the exchange
2 that took place between the two. He said it was
3 pretty much just out of the blue.
4
Q. And neither of the other individuals that
5 you talked to were close enough to have heard what
6 had gone on between the two individuals; is that
7 correct?
8
A. Well, yes, they were. That's where their
9 information from the Jazz game came from was from
10 both Josh Marquette and Josh Wagstaff.
11
Q. Did you ask either one of them as to who
12 first hit who under the circumstances?
13
A. Yes. Let me make sure that I tell you
14 exactly which Josh said which.
15
It was Josh Marquette, and it was
16 standing out - Josh Marquette - let me make sure.
17 I don't want to tell you an untruth.
18
I'm mistaken. It was Josh Wagstaff that
19 made the comment, told me that - the word exchange
20 had to do with the Jazz game and that the Jazz
21 sucked. And he said that Lethron and Josh Marquette
22 were both over with the victim when the assault
|
23 happened, that Marquette had actually walked over
24 with Lethron Tate over to the victim, Mr. Hanson.
25
Q. Okay. And what he told you was that
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AXJL-jJTUVAI^VJ,

!V"^/-^fl

Page 40
Page 42
1 Lethron had hit Mr. Hanson one or two times; is that
1 that he issued a check or authenticated a check on
2 correct?
2 occasion that was not authorized to be issued by its
3
A. Uh-huh. And that he went down. They
3 owner knowing that it was not the work of the owner
4 panicked and left.
4 and that in the authentication or issuance of that
5
Q. Did you ask him whether Mr. Hanson had
5 that it purported to be the act of another.
6 taken any swings at Mr. Tate initially?
6
With regard to the allegation - the
7
A. Yes. Nobody said anything other than the
7 second order to show cause allegation, the assault
8 assault on Mr. Tate (sic) came out of the blue.
8 charge 9
Q. So they both told you that they had been
9
THE COURT: Now, I might say that my
10 able to observe Mr. Hanson?
10 affidavit is in the opposite order of that.
11
A. Yes, they were all right there in the
11
MS. TAYLOR: Oh, is it.
12 parking lot.
12
THE COURT: The amended affidavit I have
13
MS. AMES: I have no other questions of
13 is the assault charge first and the forgery second.
14 You've presented your evidence otherwise, but I just
14 this witness.
15 want to be sure that we are referring to the same
15
THE COURT: Anything further of this
16 amended affidavit
16 witness?
117
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. With
17
MS. TAYLOR: Nothing, Your Honor.
118 regard to the first allegation, the aggravated
18
THE COURT: okay. Thank you, Miss Kent.
i 19 assault charge which occurred second, there's been
19 You may step down. You may be excused.
(20 evidence that the victim was assaulted, was punched
20
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the State has no
|2l in the face a couple of times, that he fell to the
21 further witnesses.
22 ground, that he was knocked unconscious, that he went
22
(Discussion off the record.)
23 to the hospital and suffered a brain hemorrhage as a
23
THE COURT: All right. The State rests?
24 result of the injury. The witnesses at the scene
24
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.
25 identified Lethron as the person who walked up and
p
THE COURT: Miss Ames.
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MS. AMES: Yes, Your Honor. Regarding
Allegation No. 2 —
THE COURT: Do you wish to call any
witnesses?
MS. AMES: Oh, I am sorry. I apologize.
No, the Defense calls no witnesses.
THE COURT: Thank you.
You wish to argue?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. With
regard to the first allegation, the Forgery charge, I
believe there*s been enough evidence to show
(Inaudible) by a preponderance that there was a check
that was not authorized — six checks, in fact —
that were not authorized by the account holder,
Ms. Brenda Woelfel, that those were passed at Denny's
and that on one occasion that Lethron Tate had
accepted the check, had cashed it out and given money
back to a co-worker and that on that occasion he
received - I believe the evidence was that on that
incident that (Inaudible ) co-worker cashed a check
for Miss Fivey (phonetic).
On two other occasions evidence shows
that Mr. Tate took the checks to the co-worker,
Ms. Price, gave them to her and received money back
for those. I believe that establishes forgery in
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hit him without being in any danger himself. Also
the suspect — the victim identified the suspect as
Lethron Tate. (Inaudible) enough evidence
(Inaudible) the assault did take place.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Tate, you understand that you have
the right to present evidence in this proceeding. Do
you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: With consultation with your
attorney, I'm assuming that you wish not to testify;
is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
Argument.
MS. AMES: Yes, thank you, Your Honor.
I'll address them in the same order the counsel has
because the evidence was presented that way, and
that's regarding Allegation No. 2 first, that being a
forgery allegation. The only objective evidence that
has any connection with Lethron Tate on this is that
of Julie Marks, who told the officer that she
observed Elizabeth Price hand already filled out
checks to Lethron Tate, that he gave her the cash for
that check. Now, Your Honor, that does not rise to
P a a P AC\ - PACTA A1
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the standard of a forgery. Forgery requires that the
State show that the party to the offense did it with
the purpose to defraud. There is an intent element
to that crime. Oftentimes, and I would assume most
frequently, when a cashier takes a check from an
individual, they look at w h o it's made out to and
what the amount is for. There's been n o evidence
that Lethron w a s aware that that check w a s fraudulent
and intentionally provided the cash to Elizabeth
Price with the intent to defraud Denny's. A n d that's
the only objective evidence that w e have. The only
other information — all the other information that
w e have comes through an Elizabeth Price, an
individual w h o is not present here today, w h o I have
not been able to cross-examine regarding her issues
of credibility, of bias, of motive, et cetera, which
is very necessary to the defense.
THE COURT: Now, let's make one thing
certain: Y o u have had all o f these names in a report
and y o u have elected not to subpoena them.
MS. AMES: Your Honor, the State's
obligation THE COURT: I know. I know.
MS. AMES: - is to prove the charges
against the defendant.

Page 4 6
1 would just add the caveat that it w a s the Defense's
2 initial objection that the officers be able to
3 testify to those hearsay conversations with these
4 witnesses because of the Constitutional issue which
5 I've already addressed and lack the reliability that
6 the Defendant feels is present in those type of
7 hearsay communications.
8
But, given that, the only information
9 that the State has presented that links anything to
[ 10 Mr. Tate is that through this Elizabeth Price, an
111 individual w h o w a s pinpointed at first and caught
! 12 red-handed regarding these checks. She's the
! 13 individual w h o other witnesses were able to
14 substantiate had to be in charge to get others to
15 fill out those checks. From the statement of Julie
16 Marks, she told her when Julie said that she w a s not
17 going to do it, that she'd get Lethron to do it.
18 There w a s n o further evidence that he had actually
19 done that other than through Elizabeth's written
20 statement.
21
Additionally, from Julie Marks'
22 statement, Elizabeth had told her that she had had a
23 (Inaudible) conversation with Lethron, that she had
24 told h i m that she w a s going to blame everything on
25 h i m because she had a lot to risk because she had
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1
THE COURT: That's true. But y o u have
2 every right to bring forward any of these witnesses
3 that y o u wish to examine or cross-examine in this
4 proceeding.
5
MS. AMES: I understand that, Your
6 Honor. But it is — just s o that the Court is clear,
7 it is the Defense's position that the Defendant does
8 have a constitutional right, a Sixth Amendment right
9 to confrontation, that it's the State's burden to
10 bring in the sufficient evidence to present these
11 charges to the Court by a preponderance of evidence
12 and that they have not provided that testimony. S o
13 that's the (Inaudible).
14
THE COURT: o k a y . But I do want the
15 record to be clear that the State certainly has
j 16 called witnesses that were police officers, that were
17 investigative officers that recorded their testimony
j 18 based on their actual conversations with victims,
'19 witnesses or others related to alleged offenses. The
20 Defendant has every right to subpoena anyone w h o m the
21 Defendant wants to have at a hearing such as this for
22 the purpose of examining the accuracy of their
23 statement told to the police, and the Defendant has
24 elected not to do that through counsel.
25
MS. AMES: That's correct, Your Honor. I
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four kids. S o there is a lot o f motive for false
testimony b y Elizabeth Price, for her blaming it on
somebody else and to get the blame off of her. A n d ,
in fact, that's what happened, some charges were
dismissed and she had some leniency given to her
because o f that.
The evidence that has been presented that
— from Liz Price through the officer is not
credible evidence. The only objective evidence does
not meet the standard for a forgery charge at all.
Regarding the Aggravated Assault charge,
on that I would submit it given the evidence that has
been presented b y the State noting the same objection
has been made regarding the hearsay testimony of that
witness.
Other than that, I would submit it, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. A n y reply?
MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. The Court finds
the Defendant to be in contempt of court provided in
the terms and conditions o f his probation. The Court
finds that the State has borne its burden, that
clearly in the first allegation - and I'm stating
them in the order o f the affidavit, that is the
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1 Aggravated Assault, there is clear evidence that the
2 victim identified the Defendant from the six-picture
3 lineup, there was no dispute or challenge to that.
4 There's clear evidence that other witnesses, two
5 named Josh ~ let's see, I think there was Josh
6 Marquette and Josh Wagstaff - each were present when
7 the assault occurred, there was little provocation,
8 simply came out of the blue and it was over something
9 as trivial as a dispute over the Jazz game. So the
10 Court finds that there has been, by a preponderance
11 of the evidence, the first allegation established.
12
Now, as to the second allegation of
13 Forgery, the Court finds that the State, again, has
14 borne its burden of proof by a preponderance of the
15 evidence. It has established that the account holder
16 had not authorized anyone to use the checks on the
17 account, that the checks had never ultimately been
18 received; apparently they had been intercepted in the
19 mail. These checks were in the presence of — or in
20 the possession of Ms. Price, Mr. Tate, others that
21 have been established here. Miss Price cashed the
22 checks ~ or, actually, the Defendant cashed the
23 check for Ms. Price but didn't give her all the money
24 as though he were a cashier, he gave her a part of
25 the money and kept the balance; and, thus, the Court
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1
MS. AMES: May I have a few moments with
2 my client, Your Honor?
3
THE COURT: Okay.
4
All right. The Court is in recess.
5
(Hearing adjourned.)
6
7
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1 finds that he was certainly aware of the
1
2
2 circumstances.
3
On that basis the Court finds the
3
4 Defendant, again, in contempt of court.
4
5
Is there a recommendation from Adult
5
6 Probation & Parole?
6
7
MR. FRANSEN: There is, Your Honor. In
7
8 light of the seriousness of the allegations and the
8
9 fact that Mr. Tate is on probation for Attempted
9
10 Robbery, it is our recommendation that he be
10
II sentenced to the original sentence and that he be
11
12 committed forthwith to the Utah State Prison.
12
13
THE COURT: For the record would you
13
14 state your name, please?
14
15
MR. FRANSEN: Jim Fransen from Adult
15
16 Probation & Parole.
16
17
THE COURT: All right. The Court finds
17
18 that the Defendant has violated the terms and
18
19 conditions of his probation, that there is an
19
20 adequate basis for the Court to now impose the
20
21 original sentence of commitment.
21
22
The Court commits you forthwith to the
22
23 Utah State Prison on the original Attempted Robbery
23
24 charge at this time.
24
25
Anything further?
25

J
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
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1
STATE OF UTAH

)
)

1
ss.

County of SALT LAKE )

I

I, BILUE WAY. CCT. do hereby certify that I

1

am a Certified Court Transcriber in and for the State

1

ofUtah;
That I reduced the proceedings aforesaid to

1

print from videotape to the best of my ability;

1

I further certify that I have no interest in

1

the event of this action.

1

WITNESS MY HAND this the 16th day of

1

December, 1998.

J

(Signature)
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ADDENDUM B

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3) (a)
and other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of

sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation reportfromthe department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4)
by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant:
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
Costs;

(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year,
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-1120.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines,
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and amy extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.

(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probati&ner outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and sl\all be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-

cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14).
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household.
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17).
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint*
ment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
period of.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Q for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
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DATED this fl~\ day of

ADDENDUM D

STATE OF UTAH
f„ - ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE r ^ jSp®* COURT
PROTECTED
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REP

m 27 m
LT

TO: SALT LAKE DISTRICT - DIV. 1

LAKE COUNTY

REGARDING: TATE,

Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah
ATTN: Judge David S. Young

CASE NO.: 97-1900272

FROM: Region III - Salt Lake City

OFFENSE: Attempted Robbery,
a Third Degree Felony

DATE: August 6,1998

OBSCIS:

PROBATION DATE: April 21, 1997

ADDRESS: 1421 West 800 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

LEGISLATIVE DATE: April 20, 2000

EMPLOYMENT: Applebees
3500 South 2200 West
West Valley City, UT 84119

00122991

DEFENSE ATTY: Stephanie Ames

COMMENTS:
Lethron Demetruis Tate was placed on thirty-six months of supervised probation with the following
conditions:
1.

Do not use, have in your possession or under your control alcoholic beverages or frequent places
where alcohol is the chief item of sale.
2. Submit to testing for the use of alcohol.
3. Do not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells or otherwise distributes narcotics or drugs.
4. Do not use, have in your possession or under your control any non-prescribed, controlled substances.
5. Submit to drug testing as ordered by Adult Probation and Parole and/or by the Court.
6. Pay fines and fees in the amount of $ 115 6.25.
7. Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise distributed illegally.
8. Serve 180 days in the County Jail commencing April 21,1997, with 84 days Credit for Time Served.
9. Notify Adult Probation and Parole of all prescriptions for controlled substances.
10. Enter, participate in and complete any Anger Management program counseling or treatment.
11. Enter, participate in and complete any Vocational and\or Educational training or full time
employment.
12. Submit person, residence and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.

-2RE: TATE, LETHRON DEMETRUIS

The defendant's Preliminary hearing on the Aggravated Assault charge was continued until September 15,
1998 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Hutchings (case number 981910926.)
Detective Rick Boody of the West Valley Police Department filed information alleging the defendant
committed a Forgery on or about January 1, 1998. The defendant appeared at an arraignment before the
Honorable Judge Barrett on August 5, 1998. He had council appointed at that time. This case is scheduled
for roll call August 11, 1998, before the Honorable Judge Durrant (case number 981915032.)

IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AGENT:
NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND COURT.
RECOMMENDATION:
This is provided to the Court as an update and to support the amended allegation of Forgery. Additional
information will be supplied as it is obtained.
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IN THE SALT LAKE DISTRICT - DIV. 1 COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH

:AMENDED
Plaintiff,

:AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

VS

:ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

TATE, LETHRON DEMETRUIS

:COURT CASE NO: 97-1900272

Defendant,

:JUDGE: David S. Young
:DEF ATTY: Stephanie Ames

STATE OF UTAH

)

):ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

):

JIM FRANSON, being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and says that: He is a Probation
Officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections; that on the 3rd day of March, 1997, the
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Robbery, a Third Degree Felony, in
the above-entitled Court and on the 21st day of April, 1997, was sentenced to serve a term of
0-5 years in the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence was stayed and the
defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections; that
the above-entitled defendant did violate the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation as
follows, to-wit:

A i< M i\ ~ *)

RE: TATE, LETHRON DEMETRUIS

i)

By having committed the offense of Aggravated Assault on or about April 29, 1998, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah in violation of condition number three of the Probation
Agreement.
By having committed the offense of Forgery on or about January 1, 1998, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah in violation of condition number three of the
Probation Agreement.

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order to the Court issue directing and requiring
the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any he/she has,
why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not
be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison.

SIM FRANSONTPROBATION OFFICER

Subscribed and sworn to before me/tnis .iSknEy

of ( X u i u . V 1 9 Q V .

! ^ * _

"wo i AKV

PUBLIC"!

3^3-^

NOTARY PUBLIC

DEONA SORENSEN
275 East 200 South
f l ' L * k e Ci 'y. Utah 84111
My Commission Expires
February 7, 2001
_STATEOFHTA«

Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah
Commission expires:
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ADDENDUM E

^5SR.«P*r
District
:r2

8l998

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

"•pwyoST

MINUTES
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, POST
SENTENCE JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

WCase No: 971900272 FS

vs.
LETHRON DEMETRUIS TATE,
H^*77
Defendant.
Custody: USP

Judge:
Date:

DAVID S. YOUNG
October 27, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
taunah
Prosecutor: LANA TAYLOR
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEPHANIE AMES
Agency: Adult Probation & Par
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 6, 1977
Video
Tape Number:
102798
Tape Count: 8:37
CHARGES
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/03/1997 Guilty Plea
HEARING
Det Richard L Boddy testi fies on direct and cross examination,
COUNT: 9:13
Officer Gilbert Salazar t estifies on direct and cross examination.
COUNT: 9:25
Det. Kelly Kent testifies on direct and cross examination.
COUNT: 9:35
Both sides rest. Closing arguments by respective counsel.
COUNT: 9:43
The Court finds defendant in contempt of court for violation of
probation re allegation #1 aggravated assault, that the State has
Page 1
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DATE

Case No: 971900272
Date:
Oct 27, 1998
met the burdon of proof on this allegation.
The Court finds defendant in violation of court re allegation #2
forgery, and finds the State has met the burdon of proof re this
allegation.
Jim Fransen, AP&P makes recommendation of imposing original
sentence of prison.
The Court imposes the original prison sentence
of 0-5 years and
the defendant is ordered commited forthwith to the Utah State
Prison.
Dated this 7 ^ d a y of

$JIJ$XJ^

DAVID S
District
CUSTODY
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Department of
Corrections at the Utah State Prison for incarceration.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court at 238-7300 at least three working days prior to the
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)238-7300.
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